We examine the extent to which financial market development impacts the diffusion of 16 major technologies, looking across 17 countries, from 1870 to 2000. We find that greater depth in financial markets leads to faster technology diffusion for more capital-intensive technologies, but only in periods closer to the invention of the technology. In fact, we find no differential effect of financial depth on the diffusion of capital-intensive technologies in the late stages of diffusion or in late adopters. Our results are consistent with a view that local financial markets play a critical role in facilitating the process of experimentation that is required for the initial commercialization and diffusion of technologies. * diego.comin@dartmouth.edu and RNanda@hbs.edu. We are extremely grateful to
Technology adoption is believed to be a key channel through which productivity growth is achieved (Aghion and Howitt, 1992) , and differences in the diffusion of new technologies has been found to explain a significant portion of the large cross-country differences in total factor productivity (Comin and Hobjin, 2010 ).
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In this paper, we examine whether, and if so how, financial markets contribute to technology diffusion. Examining this question requires data that both span a long period of time and are also comparable across countries. We combine a cross-country panel dataset spanning 16 general purpose technologies (such as electricity, railways, telephones and motor cars) over 17 countries and 130 years with data on financial market development over the same extended period of time. 2 The long time span and extensive coverage across 1 There is a related theoretical literature that links financial to economic development. See for example, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) for models where financial markets reduce the risks associated with modern technologies inducing faster capital accumulation. These models do not capture technology diffusion and innovation. Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) model the risks faced by entrepreneurs while the market settles in the final shape of innovations. Michalopoulos, Laeven and Levine (2015) develop a model of growth through innovation with a financial sector that screens new projects. Unlike the focus of our paper, this paper emphasizes the screening role of financiers instead of its risk pooling role. 2 Our core estimations focus on 17 countries with the most comprehensive data over this period, but we also show the consistency of our results with a broader set of 55 countries where we have less countries and technologies allows us to examine the diffusion of technology both within and across countries. A key challenge with such an analysis is untangling the extent to which an observed correlation between financial market development and technology diffusion is in fact causal. Our identification strategy therefore focuses on two types of cross sectional variation to understand the causal impact of financial development on technology diffusion. First, some of these technologies (such as the railroads or electricity generation) are significantly more capital intensive to commercialize than others (such as the ring spindles or radios) and hence more reliant on financial markets for their commercialization. By exploiting cross-technology variation in the reliance on financial markets, we therefore examine whether the relative rate of diffusion for more vs. less capital intensive technologies is greater in countries with deeper financial markets than in countries with less-well developed financial markets. Second, as we point out in greater detail below, commercializing technologies at their birth requires extensive experimentation by entrepreneurs, as the customers, business models, and even the way the technology will be used is often unknown. Indeed, there tends to be a consistent pattern of hundreds of new entrants into these nascent markets that is then followed by a shakeout as the technology matures and industry leaders emerge (Klepper, 1996, Klepper and Simons 2005) . We exploit the fact that the governance required to commercialize new ventures in these early periods is much higher (and hence the need for well-developed local financial markets is much greater), compared to later stages of an industry's development when commercialization can more easily take place through arms length financing of larger well-established corporations.
We therefore also examine the relative importance of local financial development on the diffusion of technologies closer to their date of invention compared to when they are more established.
We find that deeper financial markets in a country accelerate technology diffusion of more capital intensive technologies. Importantly, however, this benefit of financial mar- The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we use historical examples to outline the mechanisms through which we believe financial market development impacts the commercialization, and diffusion of new technologies. Section 3 relates these examples to the data and identification strategy used in our empirical analysis. Section 4 presents our main findings and robustness checks and Section 5 concludes. The increasing complexity and capital intensity of new technologies being developed across the world from the late 1800s onwards created a key role for the financial markets in helping to fund the commercialization of these innovations. In the context of the US economy, Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (2007) point out that: "by the late nineteenth century, it was clear to observers that technological change was a permanent feature of the industrial economy and that substantial returns could be obtained through investing in 5 the development of frontier technologies. Railroads and telegraphy were perhaps the first grand-scale examples of industries created or revolutionized by important inventions, but others such as electricity, telephones, steel, chemicals and automobiles soon followed. An interest in these sorts of opportunities grew, technologically creative entrepreneurs increasingly sought out investors (and vice versa) because the greater technical complexity and capital intensity of new technologies meant that effective programs of inventive activity and commercial exploration required more financial backing than before."
As is still true to this day with early stage investors, much of the initial financing for these startups "typically was raised informally from local backers, many of whom were personally acquainted with the inventors involved" (p.14) For example, Lowell was a hot Some were designed for urban use while others were meant for rural settings. In fact, in many instances early in the life on a new technology, it was even unclear what the technology would be used for. Janeway (2012) notes that one of the early application of the telephone was to broadcast entertainment to the home. He writes that "in the first years of the 1890s, the Electrophone Company in London was offering concerts, opera, music hall variety and even church services by subscription; the entertainments were delivered to homes, hospitals and other venues via telephone". On the other hand, "pointto-point communication by wireless telegraphy served as the principal application of radio communications until the introduction of public broadcasting after the First World War"! Relatedly, Nye (1992) documents the several decade long search for commercially viable applications of electric power.
Our hypothesis is that the depth of local financial markets and the ability of local financiers to help commercialize these innovations was central to the rate and trajectory of technology diffusion. While the importance of financial markets in the commercialization and diffusion of new technologies over the past century has been documented in these detailed accounts of particular industries, regions or periods of time, it has not been studied in terms of a systematic role it might play in the rate of technology diffusion across countries. In this paper, therefore, we address this issue by asking the following question: Do cross-country differences in financial market development help to explain differences in the degree to which new technologies are commercialized and diffuse across countries? This question is of particular relevance, as technology adoption is increasingly viewed as a key channel through which countries achieve economic growth, and hence, may be an important (under-explored) mechanism linking financial market development to subsequent economic growth.
Data and Empirical Strategy
A key challenge to such a study is the availability of the relevant data. We overcome this challenge by combining three distinct types of data. First, we use measures of technology diffusion from the CHAT data set introduced in Comin and Hobijn (2004 , 2009 .
This data set contains historical data on the diffusion of several major technologies over the last 200 years across a large set of countries. We construct panel data at the technologycountry-year level, measuring the intensity with which each technology is used in each country over time. Table 1 lists the technologies we use. As can be seen from Table 1 , the set of technologies cover a wide span of sectors. This broad coverage should inform us about the relevance of the mechanism explored in the economy. The heterogeneous nature of the technologies explored is also reflected in their measures. Some technologies embodied in capital goods (e.g., cars, computers, MRI machines) are measured by the number of units in operation. Some technologies that capture the ability to produce something (e.g., electric arc steel, electricity, telegraphic services) are measured by the total production or by the number of users (e.g., cellphones). All measures are scaled by population. We deal with the heterogeneity of measures in two ways. First, we take logarithms of the per capita technology measures. This removes the units of the analysis which go to the constant term. Second, we introduce a full set of technology-specific time dummies that captures the average diffusion path for each technology. In addition, since we are interested in understanding the diffusion of new technologies along the transition path, we censor the data for each technology at the year when the level of technology 8 diffusion across countries becomes stable.
The second variable that is necessary for our analysis is a measure of domestic financial development. Our primary measure of financial development comes from the Jorda-Schularick-Taylor [J-S-T] Macrohistory database (Jorda et. al, 2017) . We use the measure of total loans to non-financial private sector (in nominal currency), scaled by GDP (in nominal currency) in each year as our measure of financial development. These data are available for only 17 countries, however, so we also use the ratio of deposits in commercial and savings banks divided by GDP as a measure of financial development for a larger sample of 55 countries to show the robustness of these results to a broader set of countries. The source for data on bank deposits is Mitchell (2000) . Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on our measures of financial market depth for the 17 countries in our core sample. In addition to the two measures that we use in our analysis, we also present for comparison purposes a measure of credit to GDP provided by of bank credit data being available for such a long time period, we believe that the depth of the banking sector is also a substantively useful proxy for several of the functions that financial markets provide (Levine, 1997 ). At the most basic level, the banking sector depth measures the degree to which savings are mobilized towards the availability of funds for credit, which, as was outlined above, was a key way through which startups were funded, either through angel investments or through institutionalized sources of finance. Better developed financial markets also reduce intermediation costs, facilitate risk management, as well as play a role in governance, all of which are critical factors for helping to commercialize new technologies.
The third variable we need to conduct our analysis is the classification of technologies based on their capital intensity. In our analysis, we exploit the fact that some technologies are more capital intensive than others and hence will need to depend more on external finance for their commercialization. Because of that, the financial market development will accelerate the diffusion of capital-intensive technologies to a greater degree than those that are less capital-intensive. Note that, measuring the capital intensity of technologies, rather than industries, facilitates our analysis, since the capital intensity of technologies is a truly technological attribute and therefore it is likely to be more stable over time and across countries than the capital needs of the companies in an industry.
The classification of technologies according to their capital intensity is outlined in Table 1. Appendix 1 provides detail on the sources, measures and coverage of the different technologies. Despite our efforts, it is impossible to obtain precise estimates about the costs of these technologies that apply universally to all countries and time periods. However, we believe that the differences in the costs of acquiring the capital intensive vs. less capital intensive technologies are large enough that they dominate the potential measurement error that the exercise is bound to have. We consider that the more capital intensive technologies are railways, telegraphy, telephones, electricity production, the production of steel with electric arc and blast oxygen furnaces, and cell-phone communications. The less capital intensive technologies are technologies that are embodied in smaller machines and in consumer durables such as ring spindles, automatic looms, cars, trucks, tractors, radios, TVs, computers and MRI machines.
Our baseline econometric specification therefore takes the form:
where y ict denotes our measure of the adoption of technology i in country c at time Nanda and Nicholas (2014) Given concerns about endogeneity and omitted variables that may bias this relationship, our main coefficient of interest is β 3 , which is the coefficient on the interaction between financial market depth and an indicator variable for whether a given technology is highly capital intensive to commercialize. It therefore measures a country's relative rate of adoption of more vs. less capital intensive technologies. Our identification hinges on the assumption that our indicator variable creates a substantive distinction between the capital needs required for the commercialization of new technologies, and furthermore, does not confound any other mechanism that may also cause these technologies to be grouped together and that happens to be the true driver of faster technology diffusion in deeper capital markets.
More specifically, three assumptions are necessary for the validity of our identification strategy. (i) Loans to GDP ratio is a good measure of financial market development;
(ii) any factor that differentially affects the diffusion of capital-intensive (vs. non-capitalintensive) technologies is not correlated with financial market development, and (iii) our classification of technologies truly captures their capital intensity and not something else that correlates with capital-intensity. Below we discuss the validity of these assumptions.
For all the variables used in our analysis, we compute five-year averages and use nonoverlapping data in our regressions. Taking these five year averages increases the signalto-noise ratio of our variables and, a priori, does not reduce much of the relevant variation in the data since both technology diffusion and financial market depth are relatively low frequency phenomena. Table 3 reports the results from our baseline regression. As can be seen from column 1 of Table 3 , the level of financial development (second row) is insignificantly correlated with the speed of technology diffusion. More importantly, the association between financial market development and technology diffusion is larger for capital intensive technologies.
Empirical Results

Basic Results
To understand the economic magnitude of these coefficients, we conduct the following exercise. We first run our baseline regression in column 1 of Table 3 , but only including the set of Technology x Year and Country Fixed Effects as explanatory variables. We compute the standard deviation of the residuals from this regression, to understand variation remaining in our dependent variable, once we account for fixed effects in our analyses.
We next run the a regression with F IN ct * DEP i as dependent variable on the same set of dummies. We compute the standard deviation of the residuals from this regression and interact them with β 3 , the coefficient on F IN ct * DEP i in To put this in perspective, such an increase would have represented 23% of the gap in electricity production per capita between Italy and Sweden in 1900 and 9% of the gap in telephones per capita in the same year.
Thus far, we have shown that there is a significant positive association between the level of financial development and the differential diffusion of technologies that are capital intensive and that the economic magnitudes are not trivial. We now discuss various hypotheses about the origin of this association with the hope that the discussion brings us closer to uncovering a causal link between financial development and technology diffusion.
One concern that typically arises in cross-country empirical analysis is that of reverse causality. In our context, this means that our baseline results may not indicate that financial development fosters technology adoption but rather that technology adoption leads to the development of financial institutions. One formulation of this reversed mechanism is that technology adoption increases income, and in richer societies there is a higher supply of financial resources (in this case more credit relative to GDP).
Alternatively, the adoption of capital-intensive technologies could lead to an increase in investment (for a given income) and that could in turn spur financial development.
However, the total amount of investment involved in the adoption of our technologies is not necessarily correlated with their capital intensity. Table 3 reflect this mechanism, we control in column 3 for the level of human capital and the interaction between human capital and capital intensive technologies. We measure human capital by the secondary enrollment rate. This exercise yields two findings. First, we find no significant complementarity between human capital and the capital intensity of technologies.
Second, we find that the estimates of β 3 are completely robust to controlling for human capital. Therefore, we do not find evidence that any potential link between financial market development and human capital are behind the point estimates of β 3 .
In columns 4-6 of Table 3 , we include country x time period fixed effects so that we now absorb any time-varying unobserved heterogeneity at the country level. Our coefficient of interest attenuates very slightly, but continues to remain statistically significant and with an equivalent economic magnitude, suggesting that our time varying control variables have addressed the relevant sources of omitted variable bias.
Late vs. Early Stage of Technology's Lifecycle
In the previous section, we have documented that the diffusion of capital-intensive technologies is more correlated with financial market development as measured by the loans to GDP ratio than the diffusion of less capital-intensive technologies. At this point, the reader may note that this finding is reminiscent of the key finding by Rajan and Zingales that financial market development favors the growth of industries where there is a greater external finance need (i.e. a greater gap between current cash flows and current investments, which may proxy for future expected cash flows). To the extent that technologies are embodied in new capital, as it is the case with some of the technologies in our dataset, and if capital intensity proxies for external finance need, equation (1) can capture the Rajan-Zingales mechanism.
There are, however, other mechanisms that could be consistent with the estimates in Table 3 . Suppose for example that deep local credit helps adopters to lower the risk from implementing technologies early in their diffusion process where there is much uncertainty about the evolution of the technology and about the demand for the goods and services 15 associated with the technology. This mechanism is also consistent with equation (1) and with the estimates from Table 3 .
A natural question is whether we can empirically identify the Rajan-Zingales mechanism from the effect of financial markets in the reducing uncertainty faced by early adopters. One significant difference between these two hypotheses is that, for a given level of external finance need, the Rajan-Zingales mechanism applies to any form of capital regardless of how long ago the technology (that embeds) was invented. In contrast, the risk from uncertainty about the nature of demand and technology faced by adopters seems to be much larger early on than when the market and the technology have matured.
To obtain a better understanding of the mechanism that drives our findings, we divide our sample between the early and the late stages of technology diffusion. We implement this division using two distinct criteria. First, we split our sample into periods before and after 50 years from the invention of a technology. Thus, for each technology and country, the early adoption period comprises the periods prior to the invention year plus 50, and the late adoption, the periods afterwards. Second, we use the estimates of the adoption lags for each technology-country pair from Comin and Hobjin (2010). We define the early adoption stage as the period between the invention of the technology and the median adoption date for all the countries in sample for that technology. The late adoption stage comprises the subsequent years. Table 4 outlines the invention dates, and technology lags from Comin and Hobjin (2010) . Note that, a key difference between these two classifications is that in the first the length of the early adoption stage is the same across technologies, while in the second it varies. Also note that early adopting countries will tend to have their diffusion process split in both samples, with the early stage covering the initial observations and the late stage covering diffusion once the technology is more widespread worldwide. Table 5 presents the results for the two diffusion stages. We find that financial market development affects the diffusion of technology only in the early stages of diffusion. This is true both for splits made using a cutoff of 50 years from the invention of all technologies as well as a more nuanced split based on the median adoption lag for each technology as outlined in Table 4 . In Figure 1 , we report the results from dynamic specifications where we look at the relative importance of financial development in the diffusion of more capital intensive technologies, but do so for a series of time periods with successively increasing time from invention. This dynamic specification provides further evidence that the effects we measure are most important early in the life of the technology, in years closest to the invention.
The lack of association between financial market development and the diffusion of capital-intensive technologies for late adopters is hard to reconcile with the reversed causation hypothesis. If adopting capital-intensive technologies caused the development of financial markets, why don't we see a similar association between these two variables for both early and late adopters? On the other hand, the fact that the effect is much more salient in the early stages of a technology's lifecycle highlights the particularly important role of domestic capital markets in the initial diffusion of technologies. One natural interpretation of this finding is that local financial market development may facilitate the experimentation required with helping to commercialize new technologies.
Omitted Variables
Aside from reverse causality which we address through our time-varying controls, there may be concerns that an omitted variable that is correlated with our interaction term (i.e., financial development * capital intensity) may be driving technology diffusion. Next we argue that our findings are unlikely to be driven by the omission of a relevant va- All these geographical variables are arguably constant. Therefore, we could collectively capture their effect on technology diffusion by interacting the country fixed-effects with the capital intensity indicator. This set of dummy variables also captures any differential effect of other variables that are fixed at the country-level on the diffusion of capitalintensive technologies. Therefore, the dummies capture the potential effect of certain institutional traits such as property right protection or the rule of law that are persistent but might differentially impact more capital intensive technologies.
As can be seen from Panel B of Table 5 , the inclusion of the set of country-dummies interacted with our capital intensity indicator does not significantly alter our estimates of the effect of financial market development on technology diffusion. In fact, the estimated effect of financial development x capital intensity increases marginally for the early years.
Overall, our results suggest that fixed country-level characteristics that affect differentially the diffusion of capital-intensive technologies do not account for our findings.
We note also that our specification include interactions between per capita income and capital intensity as well as the interaction between human capital and capital intensity.
The former provides a control for many omitted variables that tend to be correlated with income. For example, suppose capital-intensive technologies had different Engel curves than less capital-intensive technologies. Allowing the log of per capita income to have a differential effect on the adoption of capital-intensive technologies addresses this concern.
The robustness of our results to including the interaction between income and capital intensity suggests that the differential effect of financial depth we identify is distinct from other channels that operate through proxies of development. The interaction between this measure and capital intensity controls for the possibility that more capital intensive technologies may systematically depend on more, or less, on human capital, which could bias our estimates. We observe no differential effect of human capital on the diffusion of capital-intensive technologies.
Another argument that could be made in this regard is that capital-intensive technologies may also benefit more from government involvement in the economy since this involvement may be directed towards building or financing the infrastructures required for these technologies to diffuse. If government investment in infrastructures was correlated with financial market development, omitting government investment measures would bias our estimates. In Table 6 , we therefore include a time varying measure of government expenditure, available from Jorda et. al (2017) and a measure of the quality of political institutions, available from the Polity IV Project and find our results are robust to the inclusion of these controls and their interaction with our measure of financial development.
One caveat of our analysis is that the sample of countries is quite limited due to constraints imposed by the data on financial market development. To explore the robustness of our findings to the sample, we adopt as measure of financial market development the deposits to GDP ratio instead of the loans to GDP ratio. Admittedly, this measure cap-tures the liability side of banks while loans reflects the asset side of the banks which is closer to our mechanism. Note however that both side of the banks balance sheet must balance, hence deposits should be informative about the banks ability to issue loans. As a result of this change, we can extend the analysis from 17 countries to 55. Table 7 shows the estimates of regression (1) . The key finding is that the estimates of β 3 do not change with the new sample and financial development measure. This suggests that our findings are more general than the limited country sample we consider in the baseline regressions.
Alternative interpretations of the classification
An assumption we have explicitly made to identify the role of financial markets on technology diffusion is that the classification of technologies according to their capital-intensity does not proxy for other classifications of technologies. That is, that there is no omitted variable in the capital intensive classification.
A possible classification that is correlated with ours is based on whether the technologies are tradable. It is easy to see that all the technologies in the less capital-intensive group are traded, while some technologies in the more capital-intensive group such as KMs of railroad tracks laid, telegrams sent, telephones installed are non-traded. Tradable technologies are directly embodied in goods whose import may be easier when importers have access to credit. Therefore, if this is the channel by which financial development affects technology diffusion, we should observe a positive differential effect of financial development on the diffusion of tradable technologies vs. non-tradable ones. To the extent that tradability is associated with less capital intensity, we find the exact opposite.
Therefore, this is clearly not the mechanism we have identified in our analysis.
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Finally, we have observed that though human capital tended to matter in the diffusion of technology (see Table 3 ), but we did not find that it mattered more for the diffusion of capital intensive technologies. This suggests, a priori, that our classification based on capital intensity does not capture the degree of complementarity with human capital of the technologies. Inspection of the classification supports this conclusion. 6 Technologies whose operation require significant human capital, such as computers or MRI are in the less capital-intensive group.
The number of possible technology-classifications is extremely large and we cannot go through all of them. But given this evidence, we feel confident that our classification of technologies based on their capital intensity is not proxying for alternative classifications of technology. Furthermore, we hope to have convinced the reader that the differential effect that financial development has on the diffusion of capital-intensive technologies in the early stages of technology diffusion of the leading countries, is evidence of the importance of local access to financial markets by the companies that develop new products and services that embody the specific new technologies.
Conclusions
Prior work looking at the role of financial market development in productivity and economic growth has largely focused on the role of better developed financial markets in allocating capital efficiently across investment opportunities. In this paper, we provide evidence for another key role played by well-developed financial markets: reducing the frictions associated with the adoption and the diffusion of new technologies. We use a cross-country panel dataset that covers the diffusion of 16 major technologies across 130 years to examine whether greater depth in the banking sector leads to faster diffusion of these new technologies.
Our results provide compelling evidence that banking sector depth facilitates the faster diffusion of more capital intensive technologies. This effect operates in the early stages of diffusion and in the early adopters of technology. In contrast, we find no differential effect of financial depth on the diffusion of capital-intensive technologies in the late stages of diffusion or in late adopters.
While not conclusive, this evidence suggests that a potentially important role of finance is to facilitate the experimentation required to overcome the initial hurdles around the adoption and diffusion of new technology. This mechanism has begun to be explored more deeply in the context of financial intermediaries such as venture capital investors who facilitate technology commercialization today, but it has not been examined more broadly as a driver of technology diffusion across countries. Our evidence suggests an opportunity for further research to deepen our understanding of this potentially important mechanism relating financial development to economic growth. 
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